The new distributed energy market presents serious challenges for governance. A specific problem the Netherlands faces is the challenge of ensuring that its privatized electricity generation companies make sufficient long-term investment in electricity supply. This is a problem for public and private actors alike: the Dutch consumer is affected; the energy regulator is expected to provide market oversight; and the generating companies themselves are expected by shareholders to manage profitable growth and investment. Market deregulation presents a broad constellation of problems, all necessitating the incisive analysis of agent behavior, and the development of coordination mechanisms for mutual benefits. The applied objective of the research is to analyze significant interdependencies between agents, infrastructure, and market arrangements in the new decentralized power market in the Netherlands. The complexities of market relationships, agent expectations, and strategy formation make this a problem of cognition. The problem exists beyond the traditional boundaries of engineering design and economic analysis. The issues are not solely technical; and while economic analysis is necessary, it is not sufficient to create a robust analysis of the new market environment.